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Is European Inter Regionalism a Relevant Approach for  










Most of the literature on inter regionalism seems to accept that, as a region, the European Union 
(EU) stimulates interregional cooperation in such a way that it may be responsible for adding a 
new category of relevant actors to world politics. This development is usually viewed by 
academics, mostly Europeans, positively, as a situation born from the affirmation of a European 
“soft power” vis-à-vis other alternatives of world order. Additionally, it is often assumed that 
the successful integration model of the EU is responsible for creating the conditions for 
emulation in other regional integration projects elsewhere, and implicitly that it could be the 
cornerstone of future world order.  
This paper explores this argument in order to provide a more accurate reading of European 
actions in the international landscape. Our starting point is the fact that the characteristics of the 
power that a nation state, or a group of nations such as the EU, exercises can be extrapolated 
from its internal make-up but should not be divorced from its actual behavior in the 
international arena. So far the behavior of the EU in that arena has been patterned along 
traditional lines of behavior of aspiring powers within historical settings dominated by a nation 
who faces problems in maintaining its hegemony. Thus, we argue that most of the literature on 
European “soft power” exceptionality is based on a reading of the EU internal make-up that is 
not paying attention to its actual behavior in the international arena. 
We accept that internal factors weigh on the foreign policy decisions made by a nation state 
or a group of nations, but also that the feeling of exceptionality – that a nation or group can 
develop because of its internal make-up – does not necessarily “spill over” to its international 
relations. So, we are going to test the proposition that, in order to protect its exceptionality, a 
nation state or group of nations applies different mechanisms to its international dealings, but 
those mechanisms are not different from the ones employed in similar international situations by 
nation states whose internal make-ups differ. In other words, the participation of a group of 
nations in the world order does not translate into a different behavior than that of previously 
isolated nation states, exemplified by the realist proposition that nation states and groups of 
nations still “value survival above all else.” And, in the case of the EU, this implies the survival 
of an internal make-up that has been successful for its members. As a consequence, inter 
regionalism can be seen as a European centered approach aimed at defending the permanence of 
the gains achieved by means of regional integration, but with little relevance in the medium and 
long term for a more democratic or more meaningful world order for developing nations.  
This paper contends that hegemony and emulation are just two faces of the power exercised 
by an actor within the international system. When a nation or group of nations has enough 
power to do so, it imposes its hegemony. When it does not have enough power, especially 
                                                 
♣ Rita Giacalone (Ph.D. in History, Indiana University) is a professor of Economic History, Department of 
Economics, University of the Andes, at Mérida, Venezuela, and Coordinator of the Group of Regional Integration 
(GRUDIR), a multidisciplinary research group of the same university. She has been Director of the School of 
Political Science (1994-1996) and Coordinator of REDINRE, an international network of researchers within the 
Alpha Program of the European Community (1998-2004). Professor Giacalone has Publisher quite a number of 
articles and books, such as Los empresarios frente al Grupo de Los Tres: Integración, interese e ideas (Caracas: 
Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1999), CAN-MERCOSUR a la sombra des ALCA (Mérida: GRUDIR-ULA, 2003), La 
regionalización del acero en América Latina: El caso del Consorcio Amazonia (Buenis Aires: Editorial Biblos, 
2004), Venezuela en el ALCA. Entre realidades y fantasias (Mérida: ULA-Vicerrectorado Académico, 2005), and La 
integración sudamericana. Un complejo proceso inconcluso (in press).   
   4
enough power to compete with an existing hegemon
1 -- or it is unwilling to do so-- it would tend 
to emphasize other elements (its value system, for example) as an emulation horizon for other 
nations. Both behaviors translate into active foreign policies toward the rest of the world, and 
activism in foreign policy almost always is born out of the need to defend itself. In the case of 
the EU, its behavior towards Eastern European countries is that of a hegemon, according to the 
definition of hegemony in “Theorizing Regional Integration and Inter-Regional Relations
2” 
(2006) – the EU establishes the goals, monitors the course of action, and supports the 
instruments required to carry out the undertakings agreed upon.
3 However, beyond Eastern 
Europe and Turkey, the EU lacks the power to impose its hegemony and is limited to resorting 
to an alleged “soft power” deal –i.e., inter regionalism.   
In the first section of this paper, we provide historical examples of the U.S., a nation state 
which has employed both hegemony and emulation as defense mechanisms at different stages in 
its history. This will demonstrate that, though much is made out of the European Union 
emulation, it is a mechanism to assert economic and political power that has been used before 
by individual nation states. And, in the second section, we discuss aspects of EU foreign policy 
towards developing nations that, when taken together, suggest that the adding of new relevant 
actors to world order by way of inter regionalism may help create a new balance of power under 
European tutelage, but this balance will not necessarily lead to a more democratic or lasting 
world order.  
 
I. Hegemony and Emulation throughout History 
 
Classic examples of the same nation exercising power by means of emulation and hegemony 
can be seen in the history of the U.S. participation in the international system in three moments 
– the beginning of the nineteenth century with the Monroe Doctrine (emulation); World War I, 
when the behavior of the U.S. exemplifies the transition from emulation to hegemony; and the 
middle of the twentieth century, World War II and afterwards (hegemony).   
In spite of the declaration of U.S. President James Monroe in 1823, that the U.S. intended to 
protect the newly independent states of Latin American against the imposition of any European 
power, during the remainder of that century, Great Britain became the de facto economic and 
political hegemon among those states. And, it was only when the British and French 
governments attempted to prevent the union of Texas with the U.S. in the middle 1840’s, that 
the principles of Monroe’s declaration were again invoked, in a clear demonstration that the 
U.S. was not powerful enough to impose its terms on the whole Western Hemisphere but was 
ready to have them respected in nearby regions (Burns, 1990: 170-172).  
Another example can be seen during the Civil War between the Northern and Southern 
states of the United States, when European governments took the opportunity to reassert their 
political power in Latin America. Spain re-annexed the Dominican Republic and regained the 
Chincha Islands, after a war against Peru and Chile; France, under Napoleon III, intervened in 
Mexico and proclaimed a Hapsburg as king of that nation. But, with the American civil war 
settled in favor of the industrialized Northern states, and the U.S. reunited by its expansion 
across the continent toward the Pacific, European powers had to retreat leaving the U.S. free to 
start its expansion towards the Caribbean and Central America by the end of the nineteenth 
century.  
It is useful to review some of the arguments presented as justifications for U.S.  behavior at 
that time, because they seem quite close to some of the arguments that European analysts apply 
to inter regionalism and EU foreign policy towards developing countries. For example, Senator 
                                                 
1 The ability of the EU to unilaterally control conflict in its periphery is affected mainly by lack of military 
means, without associating itself with the U.S. through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and by lack 
of a unitary political voice on this matter. The Yugoslav crisis provided a clear example of these weaknesses 
(Barahona de Brito, 2001: 150-154). 
2 Discussion document serving as basis for Workshop 14 in the ECPR Joint Sessions, Helsinki, May 2007.   
        
3 “Conditioned inclusion” is not different from hegemony because nations aspiring to join the EU lack the power 
to mold those conditions according to their own needs or interests. For them it is a “take it or leave it” situation, and 
not taking it is out of the question when other neighboring nations are doing so.   5
Albert J. Beveridge claimed at the end of the nineteenth century that “God has marked the 
American people as His chosen nation to finally lead to the regeneration of the world […] We 
are trustees of the world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace.” And, after the swift U.S. 
military victory against Spain in 1898, one American journalist characterized the move as “the 
imperialism of liberty” (both quoted in Burns, 1990: 173). In summation, the Western 
Hemisphere under American hegemony would be the reign of progress, liberty, and peace, 
creating a new regional order. This is rather similar to the situation that some European analysts 
seem to expect today from inter regionalism, though the latter aspires to develop a world order.  
The main difference rests with the philosophies behind the ideas of the U.S. then and of the EU 
today. In the first case, Spencer’s positivism and Darwin’s philosophy were the overall accepted 
creed. Now faith is put into the intrinsic values of civil society’s efforts regarding human rights, 
the environment, and poverty alleviation, on the basis of a post global philosophy.            
A decade later, a quote from Woodrow Wilson’s “The Making of a Nation” adequately 
shows the transition from emulation to hegemony, though the American president was wholly 
unaware of this: “It required statesmanship of no mean sort to bring us to our present growth 
and lusty strength. It will require leadership of a much higher order to teach us the triumphs of 
cooperation, the self-possession and calm choices of maturity” (quoted in Baker, 1931: 1). To 
make this evident, we need only to translate “leadership” into “power.” By that time, the 
Spanish War of 1898 had already proven that the U.S. had moved from emulation to hegemony, 
albeit within a reduced regional framework, the Caribbean. World War I would push it 
reluctantly into a larger landscape and World War II would finally turned it into a world 
hegemon, militarily, politically, and economically. 
A look at the U.S. presidential campaign of 1912 shows that of the three key issues 
(tariff, trusts, and immigration) two had closely associated international implications; 
one (the tariff) with the fight against “special interests” in the domestic sphere, and the 
other (immigration), with the overseas situation that was pushing immigrants out of 
Europe and into the U.S. And the attitude of Woodrow Wilson, the winner in the 
electoral contest, towards the international system can be considered ambivalent 
because he favored both the lowering of trade barriers and escalating restrictions to 
immigration. The common principle behind these issues, however, was the restoration 
of fair competition in the American economy and politics, as tariffs were assumed to 
favor price control by American monopolies, and immigrants were easily manipulated 
by political party machines. In this way, aspects of domestic, not international, politics 
determined the importance of the campaign issues.  
In fact, it has been claimed that Wilson did not start thinking about foreign affairs until after 
his election to office in November 1912, and the issues that first attracted his attention were 
relations with Russia and China. In both cases, Wilson favored any agreement “which looks 
towards giving the people” of those countries “the liberty for which they have so long been 
yearning and preparing themselves” (Baker, 1931: 417-418). Also the appointment as Secretary 
of State of William J. Bryan -- “an evangelist, a reformer, rather than a statesman” (Baker, 
1931: 440), who had no experience or knowledge whatsoever about diplomacy or foreign affairs 
-- demonstrates the American government’s reluctance to engage its power in the outside world 
by anything different than emulation.    
The behavior of the U.S., England, and France during the formation of the League of 
Nations provides another example. During the Peace Conference at Versailles (1918) two 
political views clashed – the so called historic current, a continuation of the premises of the 
Vienna Congress (1814), with its emphasis on the rights of the winning nations to impose peace 
on their terms, assumed mainly by England and France, and the American or “moral” current, 
based on President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. At that moment, the champion of democracy was 
the U.S. government, which wanted to establish an association of free nations, all of them with 
equal rights, in “emulation” of the basic principles upon which its domestic society was based.  
When those principles were not accepted, the U.S. did not enter the League of Nations. Other 
attempts at democratizing this league, such as the proposal of Argentina, Canada, and others, to 
admit all sovereign states, regardless of their role in World War I, establishing an International   6
Court of Justice, and limiting armaments, were rejected or postponed without discussion by the 
European governments (Llairo & Siepe, 1997: 87-88, 98).  This demonstrates that, at that time, 
England and France were willing to continue playing their traditional roles as colonial powers 
(hegemons), and the U.S. was not yet prepared to challenge it – outside its closer area of 
influence, the Caribbean and Central America -- by any other means that offering an emulation 
alternative based on ideas (“soft-power”).    
The above situation vividly contrasts with the picture presented by the secret wartime 
correspondence between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill in the 1940s. When looking at how the military, political and diplomatic 
affairs were addressed at that time, it is clear that the aftermath of World War II would be 
“disturbingly different” from the previous postwar era, and the difference rests on the fact that 
the U.S. would assume its role as a world hegemon. Emulation did not vanish; however, as it 
was assumed that the imposition of military, political, and economic power was a precondition 
for defending the maintenance of the principles of democracy and freedom at home. Soon the 
Cold War would emphasize their defense throughout all the “free world.” The American 
government embodied its value system into the Atlantic Charter (1941), a set of principles 
including self-determination. This would be applied after the war not only to “liberated Europe” 
but also to the nations of Africa and Asia, a fact that at that time provoked Churchill’s 
objections
4 (Loewenheim, Langley, and Jones, 1975: 54).   
Even at the moment that the U.S. entered the war after Pearl Harbor (1941), the Declaration 
by the United Nations became another statement of the main political principles to be 
established after the war. If this time they became acceptable to Britain and the other European 
members of the alliance, it was because they “no longer possessed sufficient power to defend 
themselves against aggression without American support” (Loewenheim, Langley, and Jones, 
1975: 64), an implicit recognition that they needed U.S. military strength in order to survive the 
threats posed by the Axis, and later on, by the Soviet Union. At the same time, at the end of the 
year 1944, Roosevelt informed the Russians that “the U.S. government stands unequivocally for 
a strong, free, independent, and democratic Poland” (Loewenheim, Langley, and Jones, 1975: 
68). Thus the U.S. power was simultaneously showing its two faces:  military hegemony and 
political emulation of its value system. Economic issues, except for the relaxation of British 
imperial preferences, were hardly mentioned in the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence, 
perhaps because by that time American economic supremacy was taken for granted by both.  
In fact, Ruggie (1998: 863) also claims that “America’s [U.S.’s] choice of the specific 
features of the postwar institutional framework – be in the United Nations, indivisible security 
commitments in NATO, or nondiscriminatory norms in trade and monetary relations – cannot 
be rendered merely in terms of marginal utility but also reflected America’s sense of self as a 
nation.” According to this quotation, then U.S. “identity” was at least partially responsible for 
the way in which the international order was shaped after the war. This argument is quite similar 
to that made by some European analysts when they claim that the EU favors cooperation and 
negotiation, over exploitation and imposition, because of the “identity” it has developed within 
European integration.  
It is interesting to observe that in some quotations from European authors who are 
discussing the present day EU position, if we change the present to the past tense and 
substitute “EU” for “U.S.,” their interpretations can be adequately applied to previous 
stages of U.S. foreign policy. An example would be the following: “The EU largely 
reinforces a particular subset of the dominant values that characterize current order. 
The EU not only does so internally but also seeks to actively export its preferred values 
of order, albeit in a non-violent and fairly consensual manner. Because of its unique 
nature, the EU carries with it some minor seeds of change compared to current order in 
                                                 
4 At that time, the British government was not prepared to relax the imperial preference system or to grant 
autonomy to India (Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas, 1975: 59), both supported by the U.S. Further on other political 
disagreements developed between the two allies regarding the American opposition to the re-installation in power of 
the Greek monarch, supported by the U.K.     7
world politics…” (Van Veen, 2006: 4). Again, a strong similarity between the two cases 
is provided by the feeling of the “uniqueness” of the international actor.  
Additionally, another interesting exercise is to apply to inter regionalism the concept of 
“collective intentionality” developed by Searle (quoted in Ruggie, 1998: 869-870). According to 
that author, ideas are beliefs held by individuals, but when those beliefs assume an inter-
subjective quality (i.e. when a group of individuals can express those beliefs beginning with the 
phrase “we intend”), the belief may end up establishing actual behaviors in international 
relations outside the realm of sovereign states and into other sovereign states’ realms. This may 
assume the shape of humanitarian intervention, or the defense of human rights or the 
environment, but only the power of the collectivity (state or group of nations) ready to defend 
those beliefs may impose its will outside its limits and even create “a shared narrative about the 
conditions that had made the regimes necessary” (Ruggie, 1998: 870). So the answer to the 
question “when can states impose their identity on others?” has remained the same along 
history: when those states have enough power to do so and are also willing to exercise it
5. Thus, 
the U.S. after World War I had enough power but its government was unprepared to impose it 
on Europe. After the end of World War II, the U.S. was powerful and ready, and both factors 
ended up redesigning the political, military, and economic international relations of the world. 
What the EU is trying to do now, under the name of “emulation,” is trying to diffuse its 
cultural norms to developing countries. These norms may be different from those of previous 
stages of European history, or show different changes in emphasis upon time, but they are 
always presented as “standards of what it means to be a modern state” (Ruggie, 1998: 864). 
Already in the eighteen and nineteenth century, European states had individually engaged into 
this practice when “England claimed to bear the white man’s burden, and France spoke of her 
mission civilisatrice …”(Waltz, 1979: 200, quoted in Ruggie, 1998: 865). The argument of the 
existence of a “soft power” in the EU is based on its unwillingness to impose itself worldwide, 
by other means than by emulation. But this unwillingness may be expression of the fact that it 
does not have enough power to do so. And, partially this lack of power emanates from the 
internal make-up of the EU because negotiation and consensus building inside the Union 
prevents it from acting swiftly abroad, and obviously from imposing and maintaining its unitary 
will on other nations or groups of nations by means of coercion.   
At the same time, if creating a new world order based on identity (ideas, beliefs, value 
system, etc.) proved ephemeral in the case of the order created by European imperialism at the 
end of the nineteenth century and by the U.S. after World War II, why should it be more 
permanent if the EU succeeds in creating a new world order now? The expectation seems to be 
that emulation will provide the cement that would make this new world order more acceptable 
to developing nations, but this assumption needs to be contrasted with the actual behavior of the 
EU in its relations with developing countries.     
  
II. Limits and Possibilities of EU International Behavior vis-à-vis Developing Countries 
 
Van Veen (2006), who supports the notion that the EU is exercising “soft power” in its foreign 
relations, accepts that “the EU’s contribution to order has mainly been assessed by analyzing 
linkages between its nature as international actor and order. The actual polices of the EU, their 
intent and impact, has hardly been considered. This is a missing element, which is required for 
a full assessment of how the EU contributes to order.” Obviously, our purpose here is not to 
carry on this assessment, but we think that without it, little can actually be said about the reality 
of the “soft power” argument. Therefore, we are sketchily presenting some examples of EU 
foreign policy behavior in the international arena.  
We start from the premise that “actorness” is a characteristic of the power exercised by a 
nation or group of nations, which has to be assessed from two perspectives. The first is from the 
                                                 
5 Regarding lack of willingness to employ power (coercion) in foreign policy dealings, this may be linked to 
unresolved internal issues, perception of this as unnecessary, lack of support by domestic public opinion, or others, 
but certainly this aspect has not received enough attention and cannot be wholly ascribed to the internal make-up of 
the EU.    8
perspective of the origin of power (internal make-up of government, domestic public opinion, 
national/regional interests and objectives). The second from the perspective of those upon 
whom that actorness impinges, i.e., the receiving end. In the first case, “actorness” manifests 
itself in political discourse and foreign policy objectives (“actorness” is here a dependent factor 
of internal make-up). In the second case, the manifestation of “actorness” is the actual behavior 
of that actor in the international arena (and here “actorness” can be seen as an independent 
factor). When analysts discuss the possibility of EU’s inter regionalism creating a new world 
order, they are considering it as an independent factor in the world. They, however, justify it 
with concepts derived from its internal make up. We will attempt here to incorporate the second 
factor in this interpretation.    
In this section we discuss, first, EU’s foreign behavior towards developing nations in order 
to show that this is permeated with the notion of power, both economic and political, which 
limits the possibilities of inter regionalism. And, secondly, we call attention to aspects that 
signal that the new world order created by means of inter regionalism will not necessarily be 
more democratic or more permanent. Discussion will center in three aspects: 1) the protection of 
European agriculture subsidies in the World Trade Organization (WTO); 2) the importance of 
European economic interests in the negotiation of association agreements with Mercosur 
(Southern Common Market, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and CAN (Andean 
Community, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, and Venezuela
6); and 3) the imposition of 
European domestic legislation on international regimes. 
 
  a) The European Union in the World Trade Organization 
 
Regarding the launching of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in the WTO, the EU 
position slightly diverged from that of the U.S. – while the latter preferred to limit the agenda to 
certain topics. The former favored a much more inclusive agenda that would incorporate aspects 
of reality unthinkable some years ago, such as electronic commerce, environment concerns, and 
so on. But overall for European governments the round was seen “as an important means to 
improve the European economy, to foster economic growth and sustainable development, and to 
ensure the successful management of globalization” (Paemen, 2000: 53). However, most of the 
negotiation process in the Doha Round has been slowed down by the EU position on 
agriculture.  
Josling (2000: 92-93) summarizes the situation as follows: “…though the economic case for 
pushing ahead with further trade liberalization is clear-cut and the technical aspects of the 
negotiations are well understood, the political context in which the talks are to take place is 
becoming more complex.” And a considerable part of this complexity is linked to the EU, where 
France “blocked a reform package already agreed on by the ministers of agriculture in March 
1999.” In WTO negotiations, it is clear that both the perspectives of the EU and developing 
nations are openly divergent. For the second group of nations, in general terms, trade rules for 
agricultural products, which make up a good portion of their exports, should be brought into line 
with those for non-agricultural products. Thus, their objective in negotiations is mainly to 
improve their market access, especially to the largest and richest consumer markets, such as the 
EU.  
But the expectation of developing nations about the scope of WTO changes in the present 
round of negotiations clashes with the European unwillingness to depart with its high 
agricultural subsidies.
7 The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), created in 1957, is 
considered the paramount example of the special treatment granted to its agricultural sector as it 
has the obvious intention of isolating farmers from foreign competition through a system of 
price support. The program, in fact, was so successful that later on production quotas and 
incentives to take land out of production have to be incorporated into CAP, justifying 
                                                 
6 Until April 2006. 
7 Hertel et al. (2001) have estimated that a 40% reduction in agricultural tariffs and export subsidies will increase 
global real income by some USD 60 billion per year, with important positive consequences in South and Southeast 
Asia, but with general gains for all developing nations, which export agricultural goods.        9
developing nations’ argument that “the exceptional has become the norm within international 
trade in agricultural products” (for more detail, see Jank & Jales, 2005).  
There have been two unwelcome consequences of the program for developing nations -- 
first, they cannot enter the European market with their agricultural products, and, secondly, high 
subsidies have turned uncompetitive European food producers into net exporters. Developing 
nations now face their competition in other markets, and in addition there is an overall lowering 
of international food prices (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001: 212-214). In order to deflect attention 
“from the liberalization of market access as it begins to impinge on sensitive domestic interests, 
and in part because it faces internal pressures to broaden the agricultural agenda in this way,” 
the EU has begun to actively support a perspective that favors issues related to the 
environmental and food safety impacts of modern agriculture (genetically modified crops, etc.) 
(Josling, 2000: 96). This amplifies the clash with the interests of developing nations that are net 
food exporters.
8  
Though much has been made about the EU position being a negotiating card to force the 
U.S. to lower their domestic support measures for farmers, it is a fact that U.S. overall subsidies 
represent a lesser proportion of their agricultural production (CEPAL, 2006). More payments by 
the U.S. have been separated from considerations about output (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001: 
216), and even without subsidies most of American agriculture would remain competitive. The 
situation of the EU, however, is the opposite. To compound matters, another problem that 
developing nations face in their dealings with the EU relate to trade preferences, as different 
groups of those countries face each other in opposing fields regarding quantitative restrictions to 
trade. The best known example, of course, is the dispute between the banana-exporting nations 
of Central and South America against the Asian-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) nations benefiting 
from the Lomé/Cotonou Convention (Josling, 2000: 112-114).     
Regarding these issues, Van Veen (2006) has asserted that: 
“The EU strongly supports the WTO regime and has conducted countless 
bilateral regional and country trade agreements that, in line with WTO 
standards, seek to combine open and fair trade with preferential market access 
(articles XXIV of GATT and V of GATS). But it is not clear that this strategy is 
based on considerations other than maximizing the prosperity of the Union itself. 
For example the EU’s agricultural policy has widely been criticized as very 
protectionist… In fact, this policy hinders wealth generation through the export 
of agricultural surplus by third states, which is one of the strategies that allow 
developing countries to industrialize. Of course, agriculture is only part of EU 
trading policy and exceptions to its high tariffs exist (e.g. for tropical produce 
and Least Developed Countries). Nevertheless, EU agricultural policy combined 
with its apparent lack of intent to trade prosperity for security makes the case for 
this potential EU contribution to order somewhat unlikely.” 
 
b) The EU’s Interests in the Negotiation of Association Agreements with CAN and 
Mercosur 
 
Since the 1970’s, the Andean nations are part of the Generalized Preferential Systems (GPS) 
allowed by the GATT. This was developed in order to provide export alternatives to drugs for 
these countries. This non reciprocal program can be altered, and terminated by the EU because 
it is not considered a right of the receiving countries. In this sense, since its creation in 1990, the 
program changed from yearly decisions regarding admitted Andean goods to a four-year term. 
Each of these periods is followed by a revision unilaterally made by the EU. In the beginning it 
only involved lowering of tariffs for industrial goods, but since the mid 1990s it has included 
some agriculture goods too (ICE, 1995: 5-7). Also, among the provisions the GPS incorporated 
in 1995, inputs from the EU began to be considered as inputs originating in Andean countries, 
                                                 
8 Especially when the French Agriculture Minister calls them “predators” bent on “destroying a part of European 
agriculture,” quoted in La Nación (Buenos Aires), March 5, 2007.   
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in order to calculate norms of origin. This way the constitution of joint ventures between 
Andean and European companies was promoted, in which the latter provide inputs for goods to 
be exported to Europe (ICE, 1995: 24).  
In July 2005, the 1995 GPS was substituted by the GPS+ (Plus), after the WTO declared 
illegal the previous trade preferential scheme. Since then, in order to continue receiving its 
benefits, Andean nations should ratify and comply with some 27 international conventions 
regarding diverse aspects of labor, sustainable development, and governance (Grisanti, 2005: 2-
13). This has created an additional element of conditionality, not necessarily related to trade and 
economic or technical matters, criticized by different authors.
9 But these criticisms have not 
affected Andean governments’ interest in an agreement with the EU, because until the Doha 
Round of the WTO ends, they will need to secure preferential trade access to Europe for their 
goods, and also make this access more permanent than under the existing GPS. This is due to 
the fact that the EU “modulation system” penalizes developing nations’ exports with high added 
value (from 6.9 to 21% from the bottom up in the EU, compared to 1.4 to 12% in the U.S., and 
8 to 18% in Japan) more than the U.S. or Japan (Rosales, 2005: 141). 
In the III EU-Latin America-Caribbean Summit in Guadalajara (May 2004), the EU, under 
pressure by Peru and Colombia, accepted to start a joint process of evaluation of CAN in order 
to decide the beginning of negotiations of an association agreement. This would include 
political dialogue, trade and cooperation, between the two groups. Probably the fact that the two 
Andean countries had already opened negotiations to establish bilateral trade agreements with 
the U.S. influenced the European decision, as observation has demonstrated that the EU 
reactivates negotiations, and gets closer to Latin America, whenever it perceives its economic 
interests in that region threatened by the U.S. (Ruiz Caro, 2004). 
Until the meeting in Guadalajara, only an Agreement on Political Dialogue and Cooperation 
between the two groups had been signed in December 2003 (see text in CELARE, 2004: 85-
128). The joint evaluation was approved by the Mixed Commission EU-CAN in January 2005 
in Brussels, including three aspects: 1) the state of the custom union; 2) free trade in goods and 
services within CAN; and 3) the state of integration institutions. Andean governments delegated 
in the CAN Secretariat their participation in the process. The last evaluation meeting took place 
in December 2005. After that, the Venezuelan government first postponed the meeting to 
present the final document, and then suspended it, until in Brussels (April 19 & 20, 2006) 
Venezuela officially disapproved the document and announced its exit from CAN. Finally in 
May 2006, at the IV EU-Latin America-Caribbean Summit in Vienna, the document was 
approved by the rest of the negotiators, and the following month the remaining members of 
CAN (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) gave priority to negotiations of a trade and 
cooperation agreement with Europe. 
Negotiations for a free trade agreement between Mercosur and the EU sprang from the 
signing of the Inter-Regional Framework Agreement of 1995 between the two groups. By that 
year the EU had replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner of Mercosur and also as its main 
source of foreign capital. Mercosur had become the most important Latin American partner for 
the EU. Between 1995 and 1998, European exports to Mercosur grew by 22.5%, more than its 
exports to Mexico or Chile (Estevadeordal y Krivonos, 2000: 2, 4). Accordingly, the negotiation 
follows the pattern detected by the UNCTAD (2003), i.e. that a developed nation or group of 
nations will attempt to negotiate a free trade agreement with a developing nation or group of 
nations, when its trade and investment interests in them make their protection by means of a 
formal government-to-government instrument desirable.  
Actual negotiations aimed at gradually liberalizing bilateral trade in all sectors between 
Mercosur and the EU began in November 1999, when the parties agreed on a program to 
establish three negotiating groups on trade in goods, trade in services, intellectual property 
rights and investment, and government procurement, competition policy and dispute settlement, 
respectively. Their work was expected to be completed by the year 2005, and be accompanied 
by the reform of the European Common Agricultural Policy, without which liberalization of 
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trade between Mercosur and the EU made little sense, given the importance of agricultural 
exports (mainly food) for the first group of nations (Estevadeordal & Krivonos, 2000: 3).   
However, since the year 2000, negotiations have been delayed and negatively affected by 
the fact that Mercosur has competitive advantages in the sectors most protected by the EU. The 
key obstacle is the different European treatment of industrial and agricultural products, because 
the first group of products gets faster access than the second one. Thus, negotiation seems to 
follow the “modulation system” of the GPS previously developed by the EU under the 
GATT/WTO, in which rates are calculated differently for lists according to their sensitivity, 
with most agricultural goods found in the “very sensitive” list (Estevadeordal & Krivonos, 
2000: 6). Tariff negotiations between Mercosur and the EU are also characterized by 
asymmetry. Though Mercosur tariffs are higher than the latter’s and it seems that this group 
would need to make much more concessions that it would receive, Estvadeordal and Krivonos 
(2000: 9) point out that, given the size of the European market vis-à-vis Mercosur, a 1% tariff 
reduction in the EU would mean considerably more than a 1 % reduction in Mercosur.  
Another complication of the association agreements is that negotiation and ratification in 
trade-related areas is a national, rather than supranational, responsibility within the EU, creating 
in fact a plurilateral negotiation with the Community and its member countries (Devlin, 2000: 
10). In this field, as in those related to security, it is clear that the UE has not been able to 
develop pan European interests and strategies, to substitute national ones. Messner (2007: 3) 
considers this aspect one of the most important weaknesses of European efforts to exercise 
influence in the world, together with the closed character of its economy, and the bad image 
projected both by its agriculture subsidies and its immigration policy.  
A closer look at the political economy aspects of the relationship between the EU and Latin 
America (Rosales, 2005: 127-145) in recent years also shows its close links with the domestic 
economic situation of Europe. This is especially true since the recent appreciation of the Euro 
has slowed down its exports of manufactured goods, with negative effects on investment and 
employment. This internal situation is making the EU push the brakes upon its ongoing trade 
negotiations with developing nations. However, European interests in establishing trade links 
with a market of the size of Mercosur still remain important, and strong German investments in 
Sao Paulo (Brazil) are leading the way in this effort, though CAN does not share this priority 
(“La decision de Venezuela…” April 24, 2006). An additional argument regarding the weight of 
economic considerations in European association agreements can be seen in the two agreements 
already signed by the EU with two other Latin American nations, Mexico and Chile. In both the 
trade component of the agreement occupies the largest part of the final document and it is 
structured in very detailed chapters, attesting to its importance for both parts.
10  
 
c) The EU Imposition of International Regimes 
 
The EU promotion of international regimes, mainly in the fields of labor relations, democracy, 
human rights, and protection of the environment, though well intended and supported by high 
moral arguments, has provided another important arena for clashes in its relations with 
developing nations. The EU’s attempt to impose universal jurisdiction
11 for European standards 
of behavior, beyond notions of humanitarian intervention and transnational defense of human 
rights, is limited by the notion of national territoriality. European conditionality transcends the 
limits because it affects economic, political, and social norms of developing nations, 
disregarding both culture and pre existing conditions. Barahona de Brito (2001: 134, 136) 
asserts that resistance to accept universal jurisdiction can not be minimized as a manifestation of 
reactionary actors or of pragmatic governments, interested in reaping the benefits of 
globalization without sharing in its costs. It should also be understood as recognition of the fact 
that the existence of uneven power relationships in the international system is limiting the 
application of sanctions only to weak (i.e., developing) nations. Thus, conditionality in the EU 
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association agreements signed has been accepted out of necessity and not out of conviction 
(Barahona de Brito, 2001: 149).   
Another argument that may lead to clashes between the EU and developing nations is the 
fact that the universal character of democracy and other human rights has different meanings 
outside Europe. So, there is confusion between a principle that pretends to be universal and the 
way in which it is construed by non Europeans, for the promotion of European values, beliefs, 
and standards implies that alternative interpretations need to be put aside or even destroyed 
(Mappa, 1996: 43). And this destruction goes hand in hand with the possibility of suspending 
“in whole or in part” a European program of cooperation with a developing nation, if the latter 
does not fulfill the expectations of the European concept. Article 5 of the Lomé Convention IV 
even establishes that cooperation may also be suspended by lack of “good management of 
public affairs” in the receiving nation (Mappa, 1996: 47). This has led Mappa (1996: 51-52) to 
support the notion that the EU, under the name of democracy and good governance, is imposing 
“a complex system of domination and management of the non Western world” and that the 
European project is inherently antidemocratic. For this author, the starting point of the project is 
an idealized vision of the EU state sustained not only by its politicians but also by some of its 
analysts. This should make us aware of the danger of adding to it an idealized vision of EU inter 
regionalism, as well. 
From a more sympathetic posture, Dupret (1996) also accepts that conditionality fosters 
more, not less, dependence in developing nations,
12 and that EU’s representatives have 
sometimes recognized this fact. As an example, he quotes a declaration made to the European 
Parliament in 1993 in which a member of the European Commission stated that the EU would 
be able “to model North-South relations in the 1990s” (Dupret, 1996: 94). The quotation clearly 
delimits the scope of conditionality – it is applicable to developing nations and not to be used in 
relations with other more powerful nations. This may be linked to the fact that some of the 
threats to domestic security and governance in Europe derive from processes in developing 
countries. These include illegal migration and drugs trafficking, and thus justify the application 
of measures to control them in the countries of origin (Pachón, 2004: 101). But, at the same 
time, economic sanctions (limitations to enter European markets and to receive investments and 
cooperation aid) when democracy and human and labor rights are not respected are selectively 
applied by the EU, as the case of China demonstrates (Matlary, 2002).     
Halperin (2006) has explored as well the problem created by the juridical effects of 
conditioning agreements to concepts of innocuity, quality, and food security, which are alien to 
developing nations. These standards of developed nations, justified under different names, such 
as “consumers’ rights,” “environmental services,” and so on, can be grouped under the general 
term of “welfare rights” of European citizens. This implies de facto discrimination against 
productive systems localized in developing nations, and contributes to maintain, and/or widen, 
the gap between them and the developed world. Moreover, these concepts constitute an extra 
territorial expansion of European law across the world.  
Accordingly, among the most important elements determining the failure of EU 
conditionality to be accepted in developing nations, beyond the discursive level, are the 
following: 1) that this conditionality is not applied by Europe to more powerful international 
actors, making evident a two-faced behavior in its international dealings, linked to the different 
power perceived in the different interlocutors; 2) that the concept of “universal jurisdiction” 
clashes with territorial principles still important to developing nations; 3) that concepts such as 
democracy do have more than one meaning in the world; and 4) that part of the conditions 
imposed are not  linked with the welfare of developing nations but the “welfare rights” of 
Europeans.   
Regarding this last point, it is worth stressing that inter regionalism in European foreign 
policy can be perceived as originating from the need of the EU to defend from outside 
challenges. Mario Telo (2001: 261-262) has aptly described this when he claims that: “…the 
European Union is a specific set of supranational institutions, a process of system interaction, a 
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“social mega-network,, a normative area, and at least partly governed by European law and 
common rules. It includes relatively binding human rights protection, and inspiring concentric 
organization… A consistent set of common values … is surviving globalization [in the EU] 
more than elsewhere. […] However, such a socio-economic model is seriously challenged: it is 
currently facing a double erosion, both from inside (unemployment, and huge demographic 
change) and from outside (competitiveness, immigration flows and so on). […] Even in 
defending the past achievements, Europe has to be more proactive within the international 
arena.”
13 
In summary, the empirical record of EU foreign policy towards developing nations does not 
support the notion that a new world order on the basis of inter regionalism will end up 
establishing a more democratic world system. “One of the most telling elements that disproves 
[sic] the “soft power” argument regarding EU influence in world order is provided by 
European behavior within the WTO. There the EU is pitted against a whole array of developing 
nations along the question of the end of its internal subsidies for agriculture” (Rudd, 2003). 
Another element is the association agreements negotiated with groups of developing nations, 
such as CAN and Mercosur, in which under political and social discourse the political economy 
needs of the EU remain the determining factors.   
An additional proof against the so called “soft power” argument of the EU in its relations 
with developing nations is the question of the international “regimes” being pushed in order “to 
assert the pretended “high moral” grounds of its position vis-à-vis that of the U.S.” In general, 
these regimes end up imposing European domestic regulations on the world, even when they 
clash with the development options of less powerful nations or groups of nations. The EU is 
exercising hard power in such a way that it leaves aside the democratic and cooperative 
character of its “actorness,” assumed by analysts from looking at its characteristics as a 




The EU was already an economic power during most of the 1990s. Also, during that decade it 
succeeded in building some domestic political support for its international “actorness” – by 
means of the Treaty of Maastricht and the constitutional foundation of the union. Upon these 
two pillars it deepened and expanded its foreign policy of cooperation and political dialogue in 
order to incorporate trade in goods and services and investment in association agreements with 
developing nations or groups of nations. The diverse political, economic and other conditions 
imposed on developing nations in these agreements can not be considered the result of “soft 
power” (emulation), even if the EU does not apply military coercion. This is especially true 
when, at the same time, the EU has a different behavior when it deals with other Triad members 
and stronger economic partners, such as China.   
It is not our purpose here to discuss European reasons but it is clear that the EU’s actual 
behavior in the international arena suggests that it may not want to securitize issues if by doing 
so it runs the risk of open confrontation with the US. Whether or not this is the result of its 
internal make-up, which limits its capacity to build domestic consensus on security issues and 
affects its response to crisis situations, or if its unwillingness has other roots, is not our subject. 
But, for whatever reason, the EU employs its power on issues on which it is not difficult to 
reach internal consensus and the possibility of an open conflict with the US is minimal. Main 
examples are economics and international regimes on the environment, labor, and other aspects, 
included in association agreements with developing nations.   
On economic and international regimes issues regarding developing nations the EU 
employs a very active foreign policy that is defensive on two counts: 1) the active promotion of 
its business interests by means of association agreements with developing nations is necessary 
                                                 
13 Though official statements by the European Commission underline “the liberal and idealist underpinnings of 
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in order to maintain economic growth that ensures present levels of employment at home, and 
investments and markets abroad; and 2) international regimes are necessary in order to sustain 
“welfare rights” of its citizens (environmental, and other, standards) at home. On both, the EU 
applies power in its relations with regional groupings of developing nations, under the guise of 
conditioning its cooperation and political support, to the opening of their markets to European 
investments, goods, and services, and the acceptance of diverse international regimes. The fact 
that this European power can be equated neither with hegemony nor with emulation, shows the 
existence of a loophole in the theorizing about inter regionalism. 
If our starting point in this paper was that hegemony and emulation are two faces of the 
same coin within a nation’s behavior in the world arena, we should add that the behavior of the 
EU resembles a spectrum with hegemony at one end and emulation at the other. Both behaviors 
can coexist in its foreign policy, together with many other ones in between (such as inter 
regionalism), and they are exercised according to European needs and capacities vis-à-vis other 
nation states or groups of nations. By emphasizing world order, the EU may be fostering inter 
regionalism.
14 This, however, seems disproportionately divorced from European behavior in 
international relations.
15 Some theoretical analysts, by placing too much emphasis in inter 
regionalism, limit theoretical research concerning alternative mechanisms for achieving world 
order.    
Another starting point for looking at the capacity of inter regionalism to generate world 
order are the so many and different goals analysts seem to expect from it – to provide 
equilibrium to world order by counterbalancing unipolar power, to develop new regional 
organizations and to “deepen” existing ones, to create a new framework organization by 
remodeling the United Nations, to provide rationality to relations among nation states, to 
facilitate the development of joint or cooperative agendas among diverse regional actors, and to 
help develop regional identities, to name just a few of them. We will not discuss these goals 
here but we want to pinpoint just an example to establish the limits of the concept: the first 
objective – providing equilibrium to world order by means of counterbalancing unipolar power 
– is entirely linked to intra-Triad rivalries and aspirations, some of them very far away from the 
needs and aspirations of developing nations.  
In this sense, groups of developing nations organized as regions continue lacking not only 
the capability to exert pressure on the international scene, but most of the time also the 
willingness to do so. Neither regionalisms nor global orders are better than their constituting 
parts – meaning than their expected results are dependent on the power configuration of member 
nations and on the relationships they build with one another. Whenever a regional group is 
formed by weak nations, they would end up replicating that situation on their outside dealings 
(Barahona de Brito, 2001: 156). This shows that an alliance of weak nations does not 
necessarily create new strength but may be equated with a larger weakness. So far then, except 
for the EU, there is no evidence that “the region has more political grunt and therefore a 
greater capacity and predisposition to assert its political identity than the individual nation-
state” (Rudd, 2003). This is reinforced by Hanggi, who states that the regions able to achieve 
“actorness” are those controlled by a hegemon, and that regionalisms “are structured by the 
way they relate to the outside world.” 
Whenever developing nations are forced to act in the international arena in support of the 
needs and interests of a Triad power (such as the U.S. and the EU) they may be reinforcing the 
feeling that they are merely considered pawns of their global business and political interests, 
and there is little hope that this will help develop a more democratic or even lasting world order 
for developing nations. As studies by Robles (quoted in Rueland, 2002) have suggested, 
development aid by the EU for ASEAN regional projects seems to have contributed little to 
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regional identity building. In addition, an unintended impact of this aid was the fact that Asian 
countries have countered European conditionality with the strengthening of their own values, 
forcing the EU to negotiate with them from a more pragmatic perspective.  
Wendt (1992) also argues that, although anarchy prevails internationally as a systemic 
condition, its effects are not exogenous but depend on how the actors confronted with it 
perceive their world. Under identical conditions of anarchy, actors in world politics would 
engage in ‘self’ and ‘other’ identification on the basis of knowledge, culture, ideas, and 
interaction. This process helps create different “cultures of anarchy” with implications for 
world order but, according to Wendt, states, or groups/systems of states, can move from one 
culture of anarchy into another as changes of ideas and beliefs cause changes in interests and 
perception. So far, however, this concept may be applied to the European experience after 
World War II, when regional integration changed inter-state rivalry into cooperation and shared 
economic and political goals, plus establishing the basis of the present world order, but it 
ignores the rest of the world. In fact, if developing nations are subjected to change their own 
culture of anarchy into the one supported by the EU, by means of the imposition of international 
regimes that they do not regard as priorities,
16 little satisfaction with the new balance of power 
can be expected, albeit in the short run. Sooner or later their still unheeded priorities and culture 
of anarchy could resurface to alter world order, and next time nations or groups of nations from 
the developed world, including the EU, will not be necessarily seen as partners in cooperation 
but as a new and negative establishment whose power they will need to confront.    
A final comment on the question of world order can be made based on Van Veen (2006: 
10), who has recognized that because “interconnectedness and interdependence grow unevenly 
throughout the world, interests in and demands for order diverge increasingly. States that are 
highly connected and interdependent have more interest in creating and maintaining order. It is 
evident that such states, mainly industrialized Western states, will attempt to push for an order 
resembling a global management system that is tailored to their particular situation. Less 
“globalized”  states may more feasibly seek to reduce or (ab)use interconnection or 
Interdependence.” So, it is not clear that a new world order of the type advocated by the EU, or 
any other Triad power, will fit the needs of developing nations.  
In conclusion, the EU model that has inspired inter regionalism derives from a reading of 
European domestic gains, achieved by means of negotiation and consensus building with 
emphasis on social elements, but as Rudd (2003) adequately points out there is no coherent 
foreign policy initiative to apply similar reforms outside the EU. Leon Brittan, European 
Commissioner for External Affairs, stated in 1997 that “the central virtue of the EU is that of a 
diplomatic force multiplier, capable of exercising greater influence than individual member 
states over the future of the global economic order” (quoted in Rudd, 2003). Thus, the EU 
provides Europeans with “negotiating leverage with the U.S. in shaping the emerging 
international order in a manner which maximizes European interests. What that order might be, 
and how it might differ from the current one, appears to be an open question” (Rudd, 2003).  
Within this picture, inter regionalism may be characterized as an Euro-centric perspective 
relevant for defending the gains achieved by Europe through integration, but not necessarily 
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